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This paper uses a novel vignette-based experimental design to investigate the reasons
underlying the gendered division of housework. We are particularly interested in the role
of gender-speciﬁc preferences: are there differences in the utility that men and women
derive from housework, and might these be responsible for the fact that women continue
to do more housework than men? It is difﬁcult to address these questions with conven-
tional survey data, because of inherent problems with endogeneity and ex-post ration-
alization; our experimental design circumvents these problems. We ﬁnd remarkably little
evidence of any systematic gender differences in preferences, and a general inclination
towards an equal distribution of housework; this suggests that the reasons for the
gendered division of housework do not derive from gender differences in preferences, and
must lie elsewhere.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC
BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
This paper reports the results of a novel experiment which investigates whether men and women have different pref-
erences over the allocation of housework within couples, and asks whether such differences may provide an explanation for
the fact that women do more housework than men.
Gender disparities in the allocation of housework have attracted interest from across the social sciences (Becker, 1965;
Oakley, 1974; Hakim, 1996, 2000; Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Baker and Jacobsen, 2007; Lachance-Grzela and Bouchard,
2010; Stratton, 2012; Thompson, 1991; and many others). This issue is becoming ever more relevant in the contemporary
Western context: women are now educated at least as well as men, the gender gap in labor market participation and earnings
continues to narrow, but women continue to do much more housework than their male partners (Brines, 1993, 1994; Alvarez
and Miles, 2003; Bitman et al., 2003; Washbrook, 2007; Kan et al., 2011).
A range of theories have been advanced to explain what Hochschild (1989) refers to as the “stalled revolution.” These
theories will be discussed in Section 2; the debate essentially boils down to whether women do more housework because
their capabilities, characteristics or standards are systematically different from those of men; or because they are responding
to pressure arising from power dynamics within the partner relationship or from society at large; or because men's andspurg), mi305@cam.ac.uk (M. Iacovou), cheti.nicoletti@york.ac.uk (C. Nicoletti).
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men.
It is this hypothesis of systematically different gender preferences which this paper sets out to explore. There currently
exists little empirical evidence on the gendered nature of preferences over the allocation of time, largely because of the
difﬁculty of using survey data to obtainmeaningful estimates of the relevant preferences. Although several household surveys
carry questions on the allocation of paid work and housework between partners, and on individuals' satisfaction with these
arrangements, the fact that these data relate only to people's actual arrangements (rather thanwhat people would experience
under alternative arrangements) leads to three main problems.
First, some distributions of housework and paid work are rarely observed in surveys (for example, surveys typically
contain very few households where the woman does more paid work, earns more, and does less housework, than her male
partner). This means that it is not possible to estimate preferences over the entire range of potential distributions of
housework and paid work, because there are simply too few observations in some parts of the full space.
Second, people's satisfaction with the situation in which they actually ﬁnd themselves may be affected by a process of ex-
post rationalization, and may be a poor reﬂection of what their preferences would be, given a range of possible alternatives.
Pedulla and Thebaud (2015) show that preferences are sensitive to the institutional context, with people's preferences in the
presence of institutional constraints such as a gender pay gap differing systematically from their “true” preferences in the
absence of such constraints.
Third, people's hours of domestic and market work, as well as related factors such as their wages, are largely determined
by their own characteristics and those of their partners e and these may be the same characteristics which drive their
preferences over housework arrangements. Empirical analyses are thus subject to problems of endogeneity, meaning that it is
difﬁcult to draw causal inferences from survey data as to whether women's greater contribution to housework arises as the
result of gender-speciﬁc preferences, or as the result of a process of specialization triggered by partners' differences in
productivity in the market and in the home.1
In many contexts where behavior is endogenously determined, a randomized experiment would address the problem.
However, the difﬁculties in carrying out a real-world randomized experiment in this context are obvious and insurmountable:
it would not be possible to randomly allocate paid work, earnings or housework among a sample of couples.
An alternative empirical approach is the use of laboratory, ﬁeld or survey experimental designs (see Croson and Gneezy,
2009; Bertrand, 2011). Experimental studies on gender identity or gender-speciﬁc preferences include the laboratory
experiment of Cadsby et al. (2013) investigating the effect of gender identity on attitudes to risk and competition; the
experiment of G€orges (2015) testing gender speciﬁc patterns in couples' work specialization decisions; the factorial survey
experiment adopted by Abraham et al. (2010) testing the effect of gender role attitudes on migration decisions within dual-
earner partners; and the survey-experiments run by Pedulla and Thebaud (2015) examining the extent to which institutional
constraints, such as workplace policies, inﬂuence young, unmarried men's and women's preferences for their future work-
family arrangements.
However, to best of our knowledge, no experimental research has yet been conducted to assess gender differences in
preferences over housework arrangements. In our experiment people are invited to imagine themselves and their
partners in different hypothetical domestic scenarios (“vignettes”), and to tell us how satisﬁed they would be with each
set of arrangements. These hypothetical scenarios are generated using a multi-factorial experimental survey design
(Auspurg and Hinz, 2015)2 which, as well as varying the distribution of housework between scenarios, also varies a range
of other factors: the share of paid work done by each partner; the level of respondents' own earnings and their partners'
earnings; the presence and age of children; and whether the household employs paid help (i.e. whether there is some
market substitution of domestic work). Factorial survey methods are a proven method in the study of intragroup dif-
ferences in judgement rules, such as cross-gender differences (Jasso, 1994) and have been shown to be a useful tool for
researching how individuals' preferences would change over a range of scenarios (e.g., Shlay, 2010). In our design vi-
gnettes are randomly allocated between households, with male and female members of couples receiving sets of vi-
gnettes which are identical but “reﬂected” (that is, the same housework and paid work arrangements, but with the roles
of the male and female partners exchanged). This design allows us to assess directly whether preferences over work
arrangements differ systematically between men and women, free from the problems of endogeneity and post-hoc
rationalization. A ﬁnding of systematic differences in preferences would lead us to conclude that gender identity, i.e.
the internalization of social gender norms, is a factor contributing to the unequal distribution of housework; conversely, a
ﬁnding of few or no differences would lead us to conclude that the gendered division of housework arises not because of
gendered preferences, but must be due to some other factor: women's comparative advantage in domestic activities, as1 Hwang et al. (1998) demonstrate this point using simulation techniques, showing that estimates based on non-experimental data may represent
individual's preferences very poorly; bias stemming from unobserved heterogeneity may even give rise to estimates with the wrong sign.
2 Factorial survey experiments have been widely used by sociologists to study beliefs, attitudes and hypothetical decisions (see for a review: Wallander,
2009). Economists have used similar methods to study individual choice and willingness to pay, preferences across products for marketing purposes,
evaluations of non-market goods such as health and environmental conditions, and to assess the utility of objects and situations (‘stated preference ex-
periments,’ ‘stated choice experiments’ and ‘conjoint valuation methods’ in e.g. Green and Srinivasan, 1990; Louviere et al., 2000; Amaya-Amaya et al.,
2008; Sandor and Franses, 2009).
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enforced by some other means.2. Theoretical background
The ﬁrst formal model of choices relating to the allocation of housework and paid work between partners was proposed by
Becker (1965), who hypothesized that asymmetric time allocations are due to the returns from specialization: if one partner is
relativelymore productive than the other inmarket work, the overall utility accruing to a household will bemaximized if that
partner specializes in market work while the other specializes in housework. This theoretical framework was originally
proposed in terms of women having lower levels of human capital than men; however, it does not rely on this: gender
asymmetries may arise from any factor which leads women to have lower-paid jobs, including (but not limited to)
discrimination against women, social norms, “gender exploitation,” and work interruptions for childbearing. Additionally,
specialization may also arise as the result of women being relatively more efﬁcient than men in childcare and in other do-
mestic activities: in this situation, women's comparative advantage in home-based production would mean that they end up
doing more childcare and housework, even in a situation where both sexes were equally productive in the labor market.
Later social exchange and bargaining theories drop the very simplistic assumption of a joint utility function that underpins
Becker's New Home economics, and hypothesize that individuals bargain over the allocation of housework, and follow both
individualistic (maximization of own earning and bargaining power) and common preferences (maximization of joint
household income). These models (for example, Ott, 1992) predict that in a context where men have higher levels of human
capital than women, men will do relatively more paid work (because of both their higher bargaining and earning power),
while women do a larger share of the housework. However, they predict a partial rather than a full specialization, with both
partners retaining some labor market power to preserve their economic independence and bargaining power within the
partnership.
In theory this specialization is gender-neutral: if women andmen had identical levels of human capital, we should observe
both sexes doing similar shares of market work and housework, while if a manwere comparatively more productive than his
female partner in the domestic sphere, we would expect to observe him doing a larger share of the housework than his
partner.3 However, several scholars have noted that women often do a larger share of housework evenwhen (or in particular
when) their market work share is as large as, or even larger than, their partner's (see, e.g. Akerlof and Kranton, 2000;
Schneider, 2011; Greenstein, 2000). This empirical evidence runs counter to the theoretical suggestion that work arrange-
ments between partners are gender-neutral.
For this reason, sociologists have been critical of economic theories that assume gender neutrality, and have sought
alternative explanations for the gender asymmetries observed in society. Hakim (2000) is the leading proponent of
gender-speciﬁc preferences. In her “preference theory” she argues that preferences over paid work and domestic work
differ systematically between men (whose preferences are largely homogeneous) and women (who are highly het-
erogeneous). She categorizes between 10% and 30% of women as “career-oriented,” prioritizing paid work and life in the
public arena; a similar proportion as “family-oriented,” prioritizing work in the home and investments in children; and
the remainder as “adaptive,” valuing activity in both the domestic and the public spheres. However, Hakim primarily
provides a description of different types of individuals, without explaining how and why the different preferences arise.
Explanations proposed by other authors include women's lack of power within the family and in society at large
(Lennon and Rosenﬁeld, 1994; Baxter and Western, 1998); the moderation of gender values by social structures (welfare
policies) that hinder couples in realizing egalitarian values, particularly once children are born (Bühlmann et al., 2009;
Pedulla and Thebaud, 2015) and social gender norms (Brines, 1994; Baxter and Western, 1998; Bianchi et al., 2000).
One promising explanation for gender-speciﬁc specialization is the existence of internalized gender norms. The inter-
nalization of gender norms occurs when people conform to the behavior and role prescribed by these norms in order to afﬁrm
their gender self-image (gender identity); behaviors and gender roles that deviate from those prescribed by social normsmay
cause anxiety and uneasiness and a loss of gender identity (West and Zimmerman, 1987).4,5 The economic model of Akerlof
and Kranton (2000) integrates both the economic perspective on utility maximization, and the sociological perspective on
internalized gender norms: individuals choose their working arrangements to maximize their utility, and utility depends on
the consumption of goods and services made possible by these working arrangements, and also on the degree to which
people's working arrangements reinforce their gender identity. Individuals whose work arrangements deviate from social
gender norms will incur a penalty in utility compared to individuals whose choices afﬁrm their gender self-image by con-
forming to customary gender roles.3 A gender-neutral specialization is also suggested by more recent economic papers (see Becker, 1973; Gronau, 1973, 1977; Donni and Chiappori, 2011).
4 An alternative possibility to internalized norms would be external norms that are enforced by negative social sanctions in case of norm deviations or
positive rewards in case of norm-compliance (Axelrod, 1984; Ott, 1992). However, in modern societies meaningful sanctions for people who deviate from a
customary gender division of labor seem to be unlikely, and the same is true for formal rewards for those who conform.
5 Carlson and Lynch (2013), using longitudinal data, suggest that the relationship might be the other way round: gender ideologies might change in order
to avoid distress stemming from discrepancies between behavior and attitudes.
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distributive justice to the issue of housework, hypothesizing that satisfaction with domestic arrangements is related to in-
dividuals’ perceptions of the fairness or justice of those arrangements (see Dette-Hagenmeyer and Reichle, 2016 for an
overview6).
The literature on distributive justice deﬁnes several distinct principles of fairness (Deutsch, 1975), of which two are of
particular relevance in the allocation of housework.7 The principle of equity is fulﬁlled when both partner's rewards (for
example leisure, or time not spent on housework) are distributed proportionally to individuals' inputs to the relationship. This
leads to similar assumptions to those derived from exchange and bargaining theories: a family member is assumed to be
entitled to less housework if he or she works longer hours or earns a larger salary (Thompson, 1991; Gager, 1998, 2008). The
principle of equality, by contrast, deﬁnes as fair a situation inwhich rewards and duties are split equally between the partners,
regardless of partners' inputs in the form of time spent at paid work or earnings; Jasso (1983) proposes that in small groups,
and particularly in intimate relationships such as marital dyads, it is the principle of equality with regard tomarital happiness
which predominates; the empirical work of Gager (2008) also suggests that the principle of equality may predominate.
Without further development, the principles of both equity and equality would suggest gender-neutral allocations of
housework; however, the empirical evidence suggests that both women and men tend to perceive as “fair” a situation in
which women do a disproportionate amount of domestic labour, and which is actually neither equal nor equitable (Major,
1993; Lennon and Rosenﬁeld, 1994; Gager, 1998, 2008). Drawing on the work of Major (1987), Thompson (1991) identiﬁes
three factors which may contribute to a sense of fairness with housework arrangements.
Justiﬁcation relates to perceptions of the appropriateness of the procedures which led to the current allocation of work: for
example, women may justify arrangements which may otherwise appear inequitable on the basis that their husbands’ jobs
are more important, or their husbands are not very good at housework, or are not able to multitask (Gager, 1998).
Comparison referent relates to the benchmarks against which people compare their own arrangements. Awoman doing the
majority of housework in her home may feel her situation is unfair if she compares her contribution to that of her husband,
but be more favourably disposed towards the situation if she compares her husband's contribution to the contributions of
other husbands. Empirically, this hypothesis has received qualiﬁed support (Hawkins et al., 1995; Gager and Hohmann-
Mariott, 2006); however, the question remains as to why people should make between- rather than within-gender com-
parisons. One explanation is that they do this to reduce cognitive dissonance: individuals who ﬁnd themselves with allo-
cations they cannot easily escape might simply re-interpret their situation by switching the point of reference (Lennon and
Rosenﬁeld, 1994; Gager, 1998, 2008).8 Alternatively, the gender roles, norms, identities and preferences that were discussed
above, are likely to be key inﬂuences on people's choice of reference point.
Outcome values relate to the values people place on the outcomes of arrangements. Individuals must want an output in
order to feel inequitably treated if they do not get it (Major, 1987); women might consider it “fair” to do most of the
housework, simply because they like doing family work more than men, because they appreciate outcomes such as family
harmony more, or because they have higher standards for the housework than their male partners. Again, rationalizations for
these gendered preferences typically rely on the theories of gender role socialization and gender identities discussed above.
In this section, we have discussed three strands of theory, emanating from different disciplines in the social sciences, but
all directed to the same question: why do women do so much more housework than men, even when they put in similar
hours of paid work thanmen, and have similar earnings? Each of these theoretical approaches suggests differentmechanisms
which might be responsible for the gendered nature of housework; experimental evidence on whether preferences differ
between men and women would make a contribution to all three.
Formally, we hypothesize that differences between the gender identities of men and women manifest themselves in
differences in preferences over the allocation of domestic work, with gender norms driving women to like housework more
(or dislike it less) than men. In the experiment which forms the empirical basis for our research, this hypothesis predicts that
women would react more favourably than men to scenarios in which they do the majority of the housework.3. State of research
As mentioned earlier, we are not aware of any existing research which directly examines the relationship between
housework sharing within a partnership and the utility (e.g. measured by satisfaction or preferences) of the partners.
However, several studies on related themes exist, and are relevant to this study. Gough and Killewald (2011) use a quasi-
experimental approach to evaluate the causal effect of exogenous changes in the share of market work within the partner-
ship (in the form of unexpected job losses) on housework shares. They ﬁnd that the effects of job loss are not gender-neutral:6 “Interestingly, it is not so much the division of household labor itself, but rather the perception of it as just that exerts the main inﬂuence onwell-being”
(Dette-Hagenmeyer and Reichle, 2016: 339).
7 A third principle, that of need, is proposed along with equality and equity, but has more relevance to relations between adult and child family members,
than to relations between adults.
8 If a women compares her situation with that of a female friend, “she may experience herself as fortunate, as ‘one of the lucky ones’” (Hochschild, 1989;
Dette-Hagenmeyer and Reichle, 2016: 337).
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women as it is for men.
Booth and Van Ours (2009) use data from the Household, Income and Labor Dynamics Survey in Australia (HILDA) to
estimate the relationship between self-reported life and job satisfaction measures, and the allocation of paid work within
households. They ﬁnd that the men reporting the highest levels of satisfaction are those who work full-time, while the
women reporting the highest levels of satisfaction are those who work part-time while their partner works full-time.
However, they do not include housework shares in the model, and thus the study does not provide any direct evidence on
the relationship between gender identity and the utility derived from different housework arrangements.
Kalmijn and Monden (2011) ﬁnd a lower incidence of depressive symptoms among both husbands and wives in couples
where housework is sharedmore equally. Lennon and Rosenﬁeld (1994) ﬁnd that depression is more common amongwomen
who feel that their housework arrangements are unfair; Harryson et al. (2012) ﬁnd that psychological distress is more
common, in both men and women, in households where the woman does most of the housework. Sigle-Rushton (2010) ﬁnds
that the incidence of divorce is lower in families where the father is involved in housework and childcare. None of these
studies directly investigates the relationship between housework and individual-level utility; nevertheless, they appear to
suggest that certain beneﬁcial outcomes are associated with a more equal distribution of domestic labor.
Several studies have sought to assess whether the principles of distributive justice explain perceptions of fairness with
housework. Gager (1998, 2008), when interviewing 25 dual earner couples with children in the US, found evidence that most
spouses support the principles of both equality and equity, with earnings and the time spent on paid labor being particularly
relevant considerations of equity. Nevertheless, many couples ended up with women performing more housework but not
reporting their situation as being unfair, leading the author to conclude that a range of justiﬁcations are used to mitigate the
conﬂict with individuals' true sense of fairness. Gager and Hohmann-Mariott (2006) analyzed quantitative data from a na-
tional survey on housework in the US, concluding that the best predictor of individuals’ evaluations of fairness was a com-
bination of gender role norms and marital equity in the form of time inputs in paid and unpaid labor. Hawkins et al. (1995)
ﬁnd the distributive justice framework to be effective at explaining the perceived fairness of housework arrangements, and
suggest that joint decision-making by couples, and familial appreciation of domestic work, are also important determinants of
perceptions.
A sizeable literature examines the effect of earnings differences between partners on housework allocations. Alvarez and
Miles (2003) ﬁnd that gender differences are not explained by differences between partners in terms of wages or other
observable characteristics, but by unobserved characteristics related to gender. Bitman et al. (2003) ﬁnd that women's
housework decreases as their wages increase, but only up to the point where both partners earn the same; whenwomen earn
more than men, then they appear to compensate for this deviation from gender norms by doing more of the housework.
Similarly Brines (1993, 1994) and Greenstein (2000) found non-linear relationships between women's share of household
income and amount of housework: women earning less but also women earning more than their partner did more than half
of the housework. These results have been interpreted as evidence for the gender-display thesis: large amounts of housework
might allow female “breadwinners” to compensate for the deviance from their gender role. Gupta (2007) suggests that this
pattern might not be due to women's share of earnings, but by their absolute levels of earnings (which are correlated with
their share of earnings); the higher women's absolute earnings, the more likely they are to engage paid help, leading to a
decrease in their hours of housework. This implies a gender-speciﬁc process of buying out of housework for which the un-
derlying mechanisms still have to be explored (and see Schneider, 2011 for contrasting evidence supporting the gender-
display thesis, even when partners' absolute earnings are controlled). Washbrook (2007) ﬁnds that while the amount of
paid work done by women, especially mothers, is related to the wage difference between partners, the labor supply of men is
not. An increase in women's wages leads to a reduction in their housework and to a market substitution of their domestic
work, but this is not the case for men. All these studies suggest a degree of gender asymmetry in the relationship between
wages and housework.
Hersch and Stratton (1994, 1997, 2002) and Bryan and Sevilla-Sanz (2011) also analyze the relationship between house-
work and wages but they focus on the effect of women's housework shares on their earnings. They provide direct evidence
that the larger share of housework done by women may lead to signiﬁcantly lower wages, especially if they have children.
In summary, the evidence suggests that the distribution of housework in couples is in many cases neither equal nor
equitable, with women doing disproportionate shares of housework evenwhen their hours of paid work and wages are taken
into account. It suggests that both men and women are motivated by considerations of fairness, but that these considerations
may not be reﬂected in actual allocations of work. This suggest a degree of ex-post rationalization (which, as we discussed in
the Introduction, is one of the issues which means it is difﬁcult to assess preferences with survey-based research, and one of
the reasons we use an experimental approach). The only other experimental work of which we are aware, which deals with
household allocation, is that of Pedulla and Thebaud (2015), who conducted an experiment using a probability-based online
panel of young, unmarried, childless people in the US, asking respondents how they would like to balance work and family
responsibilities in their future relationships, under a range of hypothetical institutional constraints (in particular, whether
workplaces provided paid family leave, subsidized childcare, and ﬂexible work options). The main ﬁnding was a clear
preference for equal sharing of paid and unpaid work: when respondents could opt for this type of relationship, a clear
majority of both men and women chose this option; and in particular women's preferences were responsive to supportivePlease cite this article in press as: Auspurg, K., et al., Housework share between partners: Experimental evidence on gender-
speciﬁc preferences, Social Science Research (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2017.01.003
K. Auspurg et al. / Social Science Research xxx (2017) 1e226work-family policy interventions. However, the authors only tested a joint bundle of arrangements (not varying the amount of
paid and unpaid work or supportive policies separately), and the between-respondent analytical design in this study means
that it cannot examine how given individuals might shift their preferences under different sets of constraints. The current
research builds on this work, using a within-respondent variation and more ﬁne-grained scenarios describing possible work-
family arrangements.
4. Data and experimental method
4.1. The UKHLS and the innovation panel
This experiment was conducted as part of the UK Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS, also known as Understanding
Society). The UKHLS is a large-scale UK-based panel survey conducted by the Institute for Social and Economic Research at
the University of Essex; it started in 2009 and has run annually since then (Buck and McFall, 2012). The survey covers
around 40,000 households and collects data on a range of individual and household domains; notably, for our purposes, it
contains information on household structure, current and past employment, time spent on housework, individuals’
standards of housework, and, for people living with a partner, the shares of housework done by respondents and their
partners. Also important for this study is that fact that both members of married and cohabiting couples are eligible for
interview.
A representative subset of around 1500 households forms the survey's Innovation Panel (IP). The IP functions as a test-bed
for innovations in data collection methods and new methods of research; it started in 2008, a year before the main UKHLS
survey, and has been conducted each year since (J€ackle et al., 2014). IP participants are asked the same questions as other
UKHLS interviewees; each year a small number of methodological experiments is also added. The experiment on housework
satisfaction, on which this paper is based, forms part of the ﬁfth IP (IP5), conducted in 2012.
4.2. Experimental design
Each individual participating in the experiment was presented with three hypothetical scenarios (vignettes) outlining
different arrangements between partners for the sharing of housework. They were then asked to indicate what their level of
satisfaction would be with each of the three scenarios, on a seven-point scale ranging from completely dissatisﬁed to
completely satisﬁed (see Fig. 1).
The three scenarios given to each respondent were selected from a battery of scenarios generated by varying ﬁve factors
(“dimensions”) which are likely to impact on people's satisfactionwith housework arrangements: (1) the share of housework
done by the respondent; (2) the hours of paid work of respondents and partners; (3) the hourly earnings of respondents and
partners; (4) the presence and age of children in the home; and (5) whether the household employs paid help (in the form of a
cleaner). Between two and ﬁve categories (“levels”) were deﬁned for each of the ﬁve dimensions; these are presented in
Table 1.
The full set of possible scenarios spans all 480 possible combinations9 of these categories; all experimental factors were
fully crossed with each other, allowing the effects of each to be estimated free of the effects of the other categories, and also
allowing estimation of the effects of all possible interactions and trade-offs between the experimental factors. Fig.1 shows the
wording of one sample scenario generated under this procedure.
The set of all 480 possible scenarios was used and split into 160 different questionnaire versions, each containing three
scenarios, using a D-efﬁcient sampling technique, which minimizes the correlations between dimensions (factors), and
maximizes the variance of each of the factors within the questionnaire versions, therefore guaranteeing a “level balance” i.e.
ensuring that each category occurs with about equal frequency (for details see Kuhfeld et al., 1994; Atzmüller and Steiner,
2010; Auspurg and Hinz, 2015).10
These 160 questionnaire versions were randomly allocated to households participating in the experiment,11 with the
ordering of the three scenarios being randomized for each household. The randomization of question ordering neutralizes
possible effects of the ordering of scenarios, such as carry-over or learning effects.9 The number of possible combinations is the product of the number of categories: n ¼ 4  3  4  5  2 ¼ 480.
10 The experimental factors were built up in order to maximize the variance of the different levels; this provides the maximum statistical power for
estimating the relationship between the vignette dimensions and the dependent variable (in our case, satisfaction with housework distributions). This
means that the distributions of the factors in the vignette scenarios are not the same as the distributions that occur in reality. For instance, in our “vignette
world,” about 50 percent of vignettes specify that the couple employs a cleaner, while in real life, the proportion employing a cleaner would be much
smaller. Likewise, very few women earn double what their partners earn, but this is the scenario given to one third of female respondents (see also the
descriptive statistics in Table 2). The ability to include such scenarios in numbers which do not correspond to reality is an important strength of the
experimental design, since it provides weight in parts of the joint distribution which in real life are sparsely populated.
11 Randomization was done at the household level in order to obtain maximum statistical power when analyzing data at the partnership level. Presenting
male and female partners with identical scenarios ensures that male/female differences in evaluations of the scenarios are not caused by differences in the
experimental stimuli, but by differences in personal characteristics (including gender). In any case, randomizing at the household level still constitutes a
random matching of experimental stimuli to personal characteristics, ensuring the high internal validity of an experimental approach (see the random-
ization checks below).
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Table 1
Dimensions and categories used in the scenarios.
Dimensions Categories
1 2 3 4 5
1 Hours of paid work Resp. and partner both
work full-time
Resp. and partner both
work part-time
Resp. works full-time, partner
works part-time
Resp. works part-time, partner
works full-time
e
2 Hourly pay Partner's pay double that
of respondent
Respondent's pay double
that of partner
Resp. and partner's pay about
equal
e e
3 Number and age of
children
No children One child, age 6 months One child, age 5 years One child, age 15 years e
4 Share of housework
done by resp.
None One quarter Half Three quarters All
5 Paid housework None Cleaner, one morning a
week
e e e
Note: Resp. stands for respondent.
Fig. 1. Sample scenario, with the varied dimensions underlined.
K. Auspurg et al. / Social Science Research xxx (2017) 1e22 7We also included the following preamble before the three vignette questions: “We are interested in the way people feel
about how couples share housework. You will be asked about three different scenarios, each describing an imaginary situ-
ation relating to different work arrangements between couples. In some of the situations the couple may have children. In
these cases you should assume that both partners are involved in their day-to-day care, and that both are happy with the
amount of time they spend with their children. We are really only interested in knowing how you feel about the way
housework is shared. There are no right or wrong answers!”
The experiment was administered in self-completionmode via computer-assisted self-interview (CASI).12 Self-completion
is the recommendedmode formulti-factorial experiments of this type, ﬁrstly because the scenariosmay be better understood
if read directly by respondents than if they are read out by an interviewer; and secondly because self-completion reduces
social desirability bias (Auspurg et al., 2014).
Thorough pretests with oral feedback were run prior to the implementation of IP5, and suggested that respondents coped
well with the hypothetical nature of the questions and the level of complexity of the experiment.
This experimental design has a number of advantages. The selectivity and endogeneity issues referred to earlier, which
are potentially so problematic in survey-based research, do not cause problems here, since the shares of housework and
paid work in the vignettes are uncorrelated with other variables in the vignettes (earnings, the presence of children, and
paid help with housework) and with individuals’ real-life characteristics, both observable and unobservable. The sce-
narios span the full space of possible combinations of housework, paid work and the other factors, so we do not run into
the problem described earlier of insufﬁcient observations in part of the space. We may be conﬁdent that the effects we
estimate are indeed the effects of the allocation of housework on satisfaction, rather than a spurious effect caused by
omitted variables. Because the share of housework is precisely stated in the scenarios, there are no measurement
problems relating to the time spent on housework, which may be the case in surveys (see, e.g., Niemi, 1993; Lee and
Waite, 2005; Sonnenberg et al., 2012). Finally, the random allocation of stimuli to households means that all12 The main mode of data collection in the IP5 sample varied as part of the experimental design of the IP, with around two-thirds of the sample being
interviewed via computer-assisted personal interview (CAPI) and the remainder completing web-based interviews. However, our experiment formed part
of a self-completion module in all cases.
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scenarios. Thus, all gender differences in earning power and the shares of housework and market work have been levelled
out; in this context, if we were to observe systematic gender differences in satisfaction with different types of scenarios,
these could not arise from different comparative advantages across the two spheres of work, as these have been effec-
tively cancelled out in our experiment.
It is worth noting that although measures of self-reported satisfaction are nowwidely used in social science research, and
arewidely considered to be valid indicators of wellbeing (Diener et al., 1999; Kahneman and Krueger, 2006; Clark et al., 2008),
they have not been acceptedwith universal enthusiasm, and some social scientists remain skeptical about their reliability (see
Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001; Ravallion and Lokshin, 2001 for a review). One concern is that individuals might differ in
their use of the scale provided to rank their situation (Kristensen and Johansson, 2008). This problem is addressed in the
current study by the fact that we collect multiple observations on participants and we control for individual effects, showing
that unobserved individual-speciﬁc characteristics (such as personality traits and response styles) are uncorrelated with the
experimental factors explaining levels of reported satisfaction.
4.3. Respondent sample and descriptive statistics
Of 1573 households eligible for interview at IP5, 1224 (78% of the total) participated in the survey; 2424 individuals in
these households were eligible for personal interview, and of these, 1995 (82% of the total) provided valid interviews.
However, not all of these provided responses to the self-completion module containing the questions on housework satis-
faction: in total, 1609 of responding adults (81%) participated in the housework satisfaction experiments.13 Some of these
evaluated only one or two of the three vignettes; thus, a total of 4547 valid evaluations were generated. This means that 66%
of adults in participating households provided responses to at least one vignette, and 62% of the vignettes administered to
adults in participating households yielded responses. Full details of sample sizes and non-response are provided in Burton
(2013).
Because of non-response at various stages, it is possible that the sample of individuals providing valid responses is non-
random. However, this type of experimental approach does not require a random sample of respondents, since the
experimental stimuli are, by design, uncorrelated with any of the other factors affecting the dependent variable (Mutz,
2011).
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics. The ﬁrst ﬁgures relate to the dependent variable (satisfaction with housework
arrangements). We calculate a mean value for this variable by assigning the numeric values 1e7 to the response categories
(so completely dissatisﬁed is associated with the value 1, while completely satisﬁed is associated with the value 7). The mean
of the variable is just over 4, the midpoint of the range; the average satisfaction rating is slightly higher for men than for
women.
We then present distributions of the different vignette factors. Because these have been randomized, we expect the
categories in each dimension to be evenly distributed across responses, and indeed, this is the case e for example, we see
that in the “hours of paid work” dimension, each of the four possible full-time/part-time combinations accounts for close to
25% of responses. Note that although the “share of housework” dimension initially consisted of ﬁve categories, we have
collapsed the coding into three categories (respondent does less than 50%, about 50%, and more than 50% of the house-
work). This leads to much greater ease in interpreting the results later in the paper, and does not change the interpretation
of the results.
The real-life characteristics of participants are shown in the lower part of Table 2. Around half the sample is male, the
average age of respondents is around 48 years, and around 70% are actuallymarried or livingwith a partner. About a quarter of
our respondents has a university degree, which matches the actual share in the UK population fairly well.
Furtherdetail on thedistributionof ourdependent variable is shown in Fig. 2. Themidpointof the scale (neither satisﬁednor
dissatisﬁed) is themodal response; however, aside from this, the responses aremuchmore evenly distributed across the scale,
particularly at the lower end, thanwould be typical for “real-life” satisfactionmeasures carried in surveys (e.g., ONS, 2013). This
gives an indication that individuals are indeed responding to the wide variation in the stimuli contained in the vignettes.
4.4. Preliminary tests of validity
For the factorial survey method to work, it is important that the three questions received by each respondent be random,
in that (a) the questions received are uncorrelated with respondents’ personal characteristics; (b) the factors varying between
questions are not cross-correlated; and (c) each category of each of the factors occurs with approximately equal frequency.
We checked whether these conditions held in the sample of respondents, and found that this is indeed the case. Corre-
lation coefﬁcients were calculated between the scenario components and eight individual- or couple-level characteristics
(age, sex, marital status, number of children, actual satisfaction with housework arrangements, both partners’ hours of
housework, and between-partner differences in standards of housework). These coefﬁcients were all below jrj ¼ 0.04,13 Note that the hypothetical nature of the vignettes, in which respondents were asked to imagine being married or living with a partner, meant that all
adult IP sample members, and not just those actually living with a partner, were eligible to participate.
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Fig. 2. Distribution of responses to housework satisfaction vignettes.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics.
Mean Standard deviation
Dependent variable: self-reported satisfaction
Women 4.042 1.919
Men 4.261 1.860
All 4.142 1.895
Descriptive statistics relating to vignette dimensions and categories
Share of housework (ref: respondent does about 50%)
Respondent does < 50% of housework 0.401
Respondent does > 50% of housework 0.409
Hours of paid work (ref: both partners work full-time)
Both partners work part-time 0.248
Respondent works full-time, partner part-time 0.250
Respondent works part-time, partner full-time 0.241
Hourly pay (ref: resp. and partner's pay about equal)
Respondent's pay half that of partner 0.343
Respondent's pay double that of partner 0.330
Paid help with housework (ref: none)
Cleaner employed one morning per week 0.506
Presence of children (ref: none)
6-month-old child 0.236
5-year-old child 0.253
15-year-old child 0.249
“Real-life” characteristics of respondents
Male 0.455
Age 47.711 16.845
Married 0.576
No. of children 0.469 0.891
Working 0.599
Student or training 0.068
Education (ref: no qualiﬁcations)
GCSE/O-level 0.216
A-level 0.215
Vocational/professional and other qualiﬁcations 0.189
University degree 0.280
Number of individuals 1609
Number of observations 4547
Notes: The statistics in the second panel (statistics relating to vignette dimensions and categories) relate to the characteristics of the
scenarios administered to respondents, and not to the characteristics of respondents themselves.
Educational categories relate to the UK qualiﬁcation system. GCSEs/O-levels are school-based qualiﬁcations obtained via examination at
age 16; A-levels are academic qualiﬁcations obtained via examination at age 18. Individuals with both a university degree and vocational/
professional qualiﬁcations appear in the “university degree” category.
K. Auspurg et al. / Social Science Research xxx (2017) 1e22 9demonstrating that condition (a) is satisﬁed. All cross-correlations between the factors varying between questions were also
well below 0.04, satisfying condition (b). Finally, there is almost perfect balance between the levels of each of the factors,
satisfying condition (c). We carry out further validity tests in Section 4.3.Please cite this article in press as: Auspurg, K., et al., Housework share between partners: Experimental evidence on gender-
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5.1. Model for estimation
Our multifactorial experimental design allows us to study the relationship between individuals’ perceived utility derived
from different arrangements for housework and paid work, controlling for the wage levels of both partners, for the presence
and age of children, and for whether there is paid help for domestic work.
By assuming that the level of satisfaction which people report for different hypothetical scenarios reﬂects their actual
utility, say y*, we estimate the following utility model:
y*is ¼ Xisbþ mi þ εis; (1)
where yis* is the utility of individual i corresponding to the vignette (scenario) s (s ¼ 1,2,3); Xis is the vector of explanatory
variables that characterize the vignette's factors; mi is the individual-speciﬁc effect capturing characteristics that are speciﬁc
to the individual andwhichmight affect the level of reported satisfaction (for example, personality traits andmood on the day
of the interview); and εis is the idiosyncratic error term which we assume to be independent of the explanatory variables.
We begin by estimating a linear regression model with random effects, with clustered robust standard errors to take
account of the possible correlation in the error term within households. The model includes dummy variables for different
levels of the ﬁve factors describing the vignettes, plus interactions between the housework share dummies and each of the
remaining four factors;14 we also control for individual age and age squared.155.2. Main results
Results from linear random effects models are presented in Table 3. Main effects from the vignette factors are reported at
the top of the table, followed by interactions between housework shares and all the other factors. Because this is a very large
table, only coefﬁcients and signiﬁcance levels are shown; full results with standard errors are reported in Table A1 in
Appendix 1. Results are shown for the combined sample of men and women (Column 1) and for women and men sepa-
rately (Columns 2 and 3); Column 4 shows the difference in the coefﬁcients across gender computed using the pooled sample
of women andmen but allowing the coefﬁcients to vary by gender.16 Themain effects suggest that bothmen andwomen have
a preference for housework to be distributed equally between the members of a couple, with both the alternatives (doing less
housework than one's partner, and doing more than one's partner) being associated with signiﬁcantly lower satisfaction
scores. The negative coefﬁcients on unequal hours of housework are offset (but only partially) by the interaction terms be-
tween housework and shares of paid work. In the ﬁrst group of interactions (interactions with the “respondent does < 50%
housework” variable), the interaction coefﬁcient on “respondent works full-time, partner works part-time” is much larger
than the corresponding coefﬁcient on “respondent part-time, partner full-time”; that is, people are happier doing less
housework if they do more paid work than their partner. In the second group (interactions with the “respondent does > 50%
housework” variable), the interaction coefﬁcient on “respondent part-time, partner full-time” is much larger than the
interaction coefﬁcient on “respondent full-time, partner part-time”; that is, people are happier doing more housework if they
do less paid work than their partner. Thus, as well as indicating a preference for an equal division of housework, the results
also suggest that respondents are considering the total distribution of paid and unpaid work, and indicating that as well as
demonstrating an overall preference for equality, both men and women are also motivated by considerations of equity in the
total allocation of work.
The coefﬁcients in Table 3 are most easily interpreted graphically. Fig. 3 shows predicted satisfaction levels for men and
women, varying the vignette factors.
Predicted values are calculated at the midpoint of the age variable (about 48 years) and, unless stated, for the reference
groups for all the vignette variables (which are the labor market categories “both full-time;” and “hourly pay about equal;”
and for the further categories: “no cleaner;” “no children”). Predictions are estimated using the pooled sample of men and
women, imposing a zero random effect and a zero idiosyncratic error εis.
Three pairs of predicted values are shown for each situation. In each case, the left-hand pair relates to the situation in
which the respondent does less housework than his or her partner; the central pair relates to the situation in which both
partners do equal shares, and the right-hand pair relates to the situation in which the respondent does more housework.14 This yields a model with 18 interaction terms. Models with large numbers of interaction terms may suffer from problems of low power, driven by
multicollinearity between regressors (Friedrich, 1982). In our analysis this is unlikely to be a substantial problem because the experimental design min-
imizes correlation between experimental factors. However, we report results from alternative speciﬁcations with smaller numbers of interaction terms in
Section 4.3.
15 Additional controls for the respondents' earnings level, actual family and employment status, or housework share did not change the substantive
results. Given the experimental design, we used parsimonious models restricted mostly to experimental stimuli.
16 The differences in coefﬁcients reported in Column 4 are almost identical to the differences between Columns 2 and 3; the slight discrepancies are due to
small differences in the variance of the unobserved component between men and women.
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Table 3
Linear random effects model of satisfaction ratings.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Women Men Gender difference
Main effects: vignette factors
Share of housework (ref: about the same)
Resp. does <50% of housework 1.106** 1.194** 1.012** 0.190
Resp. does >50% of housework 1.539** 1.699** 1.387** 0.306
Hours of paid work (ref: both full-time)
Both part-time 0.167 0.188 0.094 0.096
Resp. full-time, partner part-time 0.726** 1.030** 0.365 0.671*
Resp. part-time, partner full-time 0.287 0.355 0.179 0.166
Hourly pay (ref: about equal)
Resp. hourly pay half that of partner 0.033 0.015 0.060 0.063
Resp. hourly pay double that of partner 0.148 0.101 0.158 0.059
Paid help with housework (ref: none)
Cleaner one morning per week 0.014 0.015 0.050 0.027
Presence of children (ref: none)
6-month-old child 0.005 0.157 0.238 0.394
5-year-old child 0.034 0.306 0.273 0.585*
15-year-old child 0.322* 0.315 0.307 0.001
Interactions: Resp. does <50% housework X
Both part-time 0.313 0.337 0.238 0.106
Resp. full-time, partner part-time 1.249** 1.537** 0.921** 0.633
Resp. part-time, partner full-time 0.533** 0.460 0.571* 0.113
Resp. hourly pay half that of partner 0.009 0.082 0.077 0.154
Resp. hourly pay double that of partner 0.438** 0.458* 0.352 0.091
Cleaner one morning per week 0.105 0.092 0.153 0.062
6-month-old child 0.034 0.057 0.066 0.097
5-year-old child 0.118 0.333 0.157 0.494
15-year-old child 0.578** 0.519* 0.601* 0.100
Interactions: Resp. does >50% housework X
Both part-time 0.088 0.018 0.156 0.131
Resp. full-time, partner part-time 0.531** 0.771** 0.261 0.505
Resp. part-time, partner full-time 1.062** 1.313** 0.760** 0.529
Resp. hourly pay half that of partner 0.167 0.049 0.299 0.244
Resp. hourly pay double that of partner 0.084 0.030 0.180 0.217
Cleaner one morning per week 0.352** 0.453* 0.256 0.198
6-month-old child 0.034 0.178 0.218 0.397
5-year-old child 0.079 0.370 0.282 0.650
15-year-old child 0.391* 0.358 0.381 0.038
Age 0.044** 0.043** 0.040* 0.003
Age squared 0.0005** 0.0005** 0.0005** 0.0003
Constant 5.875** 5.933** 5.733** 0.205
Number of observations 4547 2476 2071 4547
Number of individuals 1541 841 700 1541
Wald test c2 404.02 307.77 167.25 457.38
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Rho 0.473 0.434 0.518 0.472
Notes: Asterisks denote signiﬁcance levels. **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. Standard errors are robust to correlation between individuals belonging to the same
household.
(1) Model with equal coefﬁcients across gender and using the pooled sample of women and men.
(2) Separate model for women. (3) Separate model for men.
(4) Model with different coefﬁcients across gender and using the pooled sample of women and men.
The Wald test relates to the joint signiﬁcance of all coefﬁcients in the column. It is distributed as c2(31) for Columns 1e3 and c2(63) for Column 4.
Rho is the fraction of the variance of the unobserved component explained by the random effect.
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short of statistical signiﬁcance, even at the 10% level.
In general, it is evident that both men and women prefer a situation in which the housework is equally shared. In most
scenarios, bothmen andwomen seem somewhat to prefer to have their partner domost of the housework over doingmost of
the housework themselves; however, these differences are small compared to the substantial differences in preferences
between equal and unequal shares.
The only situation in which there is not an unequivocal preference for equal shares of housework is when the respondent
works full-time and their partner works part-time.We ﬁnd no gender difference in the level of satisfactionwhen respondents
consider a scenario where they work full-time, their partner works part-time, and the respondent does less housework thanPlease cite this article in press as: Auspurg, K., et al., Housework share between partners: Experimental evidence on gender-
speciﬁc preferences, Social Science Research (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2017.01.003
Fig. 3. Predicted men and women satisfaction scores for different combinations of vignette factors.
Notes: Each set of predicted values contains three pairs of predictions:
Respondent does LESS housework than partner (left-hand side)
Respondent and partner do EQUAL SHARES of housework (center)
Respondent does MORE housework than partner (right-hand side).
Predicted satisfaction scores are estimated from pooled sample of men and women, imposing zero random effect and zero idiosyncratic error. Predictions based
on individuals aged 48, with characteristics in reference category unless otherwise speciﬁed; n ¼ 4547 vignette judgements and n ¼ 1541 respondents.
K. Auspurg et al. / Social Science Research xxx (2017) 1e2212their partner. However, women are less happy than men in situations where they work full-time, their partner works part-
time, and they do the same amount of housework, or more, than their partner (top panel of Fig. 3). In other words, women
seem to have a stronger preference for adjusting their housework share downwards when they do the majority of paid work.
This asymmetry is also evident in the scenarios where the respondent works part-time and the partner works full-time; in
this scenario, women prefer doing more housework than their partner over doing less, while men seem indifferent between
doing more or less housework. These results are congruent with the empirical evidence produced by Gough and KillewaldPlease cite this article in press as: Auspurg, K., et al., Housework share between partners: Experimental evidence on gender-
speciﬁc preferences, Social Science Research (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2017.01.003
K. Auspurg et al. / Social Science Research xxx (2017) 1e22 13(2011), who ﬁnd that people increase their share of housework on losing their job, but women increase twice as much their
housework share than men.17
Note that in scenarios where the woman works full-time, while the man works part-time, women prefer a share of
housework that is less than half, while men prefer an equal share. In other words, scenarios where a womanworks full-time
while the man works part-time may lead to some disagreements on how to allocate the share of housework between
partners. If the allocation of housework is decided bymaximizing the sum of the satisfaction of the two partners, thenwomen
who work full-time while their partner works part-time would end up doing as much housework as their partner. This
obviously decreases their level of satisfaction and may cause conﬂict and disagreements within partners, which could be
resolved by avoiding arrangements where women do more paid work than their partner.
In virtually all other scenarios, it is clear that the differences between predicted values for men and women are very small.
There are two exceptions: when a 6-month-old or 5-year-old child is present, women seem to be happier with equal shares of
the housework than when no child is present, while men seem to be less happy.18 It is interesting that, even in scenarios in
which (small) children are present (i.e. those scenarios where in reality very traditional divisions of labor might be observed),
respondents tended to opt for equal allocations where these were available. This is in line with the results of Bühlmann et al.
(2009) and Pedulla and Thebaud (2015): in the absence of (institutional) constraints, individuals prefer gender neutral over
gendered arrangements.
Testing formally for gender differences across the full model allowing all coefﬁcients to differ between men and women, a
Wald test (distributed as c2 with 32 degrees of freedom) takes the value 46.77, with a p-value of 0.045. Thus, at the 1% level of
signiﬁcance, we do not reject the hypothesis that all regression coefﬁcients between genders are equal, but at 5% level we do.
Although the structures of men's andwomen's preferences appear to be similar, it may be that these similarities relate only
to mean effects, and that they mask a degree of heterogeneity. In particular, preference theory (Hakim, 1996, 2000) which
suggests that women are much more heterogeneous than men in their preferences over the allocation of work in the
household,might predict a higher degree of dispersion in our estimates forwomen. Fig. 4 plots estimated coefﬁcients from the
regressions reported inTable 3, togetherwith 95% conﬁdence intervals. The variance inmean satisfaction ratings, measured by
the standard deviation of the respondent-speciﬁc random intercept mi, is actually slightly larger for men than for women;19
and there is no evidence that women's preferences over the different employment or housework options presented in the
vignettes have a higher variance (larger conﬁdence intervals) than those of men; women generally show a strong tendency to
avoid very home-centered arrangements where they have to fulﬁll a larger share of housework than their partner.20
All in all these results suggest that the structure of preferences does not differ systematically betweenmen andwomen; in fact,
withoneor twoexceptions,menandwomenhave remarkably similar preferences over the allocationof paidwork andhousework.
In particular, there is no evidence at all that women have stronger preferences thanmen for a larger share of housework or
for a smaller share of market work (or, put another way, men do not have stronger preferences than women for a smaller
share of the housework or for a larger share of market work). The main ﬁnding (which supports the ﬁndings of both
Bühlmann et al., 2009; Pedulla and Thebaud, 2015) is of a preference for equality: both sexes appear to prefer an equal
allocation of housework; and both sexes are more likely to feel more favourably disposed to doing a higher share of the
housework if their partners are doing more of the market work, suggesting that couples invoke considerations of equity as
well as equality. Both are gender-neutral principles, which suggests that the gendered division of labor which we observe in
real life cannot be explained by gender differences in preferences or by internalization of gender norms, but must be caused
by some other mechanism.5.3. Validity and robustness checks
The principal advantage of our factorial experiment is that it provides a solution to the problems of sample selection and
endogeneity which may give rise to bias in satisfaction models when data from standard sample surveys are used. In this
section, we deal with a number of issues relating to the validity of our experiment and of the associated results.
5.3.1. Non-linearities in the scale of reported satisfaction
The linear model presented in Table 3 implicitly assumes that the 7-point scale of reported satisfaction is a direct measure
of utility, and that each increment on the scale corresponds to a similar increment in individuals’ utility. If this assumption
does not hold, the linear model may give biased results. As a check, we re-estimate the model using an ordered probit17 At the same time this results runs counter the assumption often found in justice literature, that women have a stronger preference for equality (see, e.g.,
Major, 1987, 1993). However, also other more recent work on earnings inequalities did not ﬁnd support for such gender differences in justice principles
(Auspurg et al. 2017).
18 In addition one can see from Fig. 3 that following respondents' evaluations the time budget is more relevant than their earning power in determining
ideal shares of housework: both men and women prefer to exchange higher working hours against lower housework shares, while having a relatively
higher hourly pay has ceteris paribus (given that both perform an equal amount of paid workdboth work full-time) only a small exchange value in regard to
an ideal share of housework.
19 Running separate random intercept regressions for male and female respondents, the estimated standard deviations of random intercepts are: sd(mi_
men) ¼ 1.13; sd(mi_women) ¼ 0.99.
20 Fagan (2001) and McRae (2003) also test (and reject) preference theory, with different methodologies.
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Fig. 4. Evaluation of vignette dimensions by gender of respondent.
Notes: The ﬁgure shows the b-coefﬁcients of the different vignette dimensions attached with 95% conﬁdence intervals. The coefﬁcients result of a random
intercept regression with n ¼ 2476 vignette judgments of n ¼ 841 female respondents and n ¼ 2071 vignette judgments of n ¼ 700 male respondents. Reference
categories: both full-time; earnings (hourly pay): both partners equal; no cleaner; no child; equal shares of housework (50%).
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the estimated coefﬁcients are extremely similar between men and women (standard errors are reported in Table A2 in the
Appendix).
5.3.2. The number of interaction terms
The model presented in Table 3 includes 18 interaction terms. A known feature of models with large numbers of inter-
action terms is that they are susceptible to problems of low power, because of multicollinearity between regressors (Friedrich,
1982). This is unlikely to be a signiﬁcant problem in the context of the current analysis, since the experimental design
minimizes correlation between the experimental factors, and therefore between the different interaction terms. Neverthe-
less, it is worth investigating whether the lack of signiﬁcant differences between men's and women's preferences could arise
from the inclusion of large numbers of regressors. We therefore re-estimate ﬁve variants of the model, including only in-
teractions with (a) hours of work variables; (b) hourly pay variables; (c) the help with housework variable (cleaner); (d) the
presence of children variables; and (e) no interaction terms at all. All of these models yield results which are qualitatively
similar to those presented in Table 3; in particular, all share the ﬁnding of a signiﬁcant preference among both sexes for an
equal distribution of housework, and a general absence of differences between the coefﬁcients for men andwomen. However,
one interesting ﬁnding does emerge. Table 3 revealed that the general distaste for doing a larger share of the housework was
slightly more pronounced among women than among men, but this was not statistically signiﬁcant. In three of the reduced
models (a, c and e) this difference becomes statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. This runs counter to our hypothesis: if
preferences were driven by internalized social norms, we would expect women to display less, not more, distaste for a sit-
uation in which they do the majority of the housework.
5.3.3. Random distribution of vignettes
Although vignettes (and factors within vignettes) were randomly assigned to sample members, it does not necessarily
follow that vignettes are completely randomly distributed among respondents, since some people do not respond to one or
more of the questions.We investigate this possibility by checkingwhether our ﬁnal subsample still constitutes a valid random
experiment; to do this, we need to conﬁrm that the factors deﬁning each vignette are uncorrelated with both observed and
unobserved individual characteristics. It is relatively straightforward to test for correlation with observed characteristics (see
the validity tests described in Section 4.4). We test for correlationwith unobserved characteristics by re-estimating themodel
under both ﬁxed and random effects speciﬁcations, and testing whether there are statistically signiﬁcant differences between
the two sets of estimates, using a Hausman-type test that is robust to potential correlation in the errors within individuals, as
suggested by Wooldridge (2002); in effect, this constitutes a test of whether the controls in the model are uncorrelated withPlease cite this article in press as: Auspurg, K., et al., Housework share between partners: Experimental evidence on gender-
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Table 4
Ordered probit model for satisfaction with individual random effects.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
All Women Men Gender difference
Main effects: vignette factors
Share of housework (ref: about the same)
Resp. does <50% of housework 0.925** 0.973** 0.898** 0.169
Resp. does >50% of housework 1.270** 1.355** 1.217** 0.258
Hours of paid work (ref: both full-time)
Both part-time 0.149 0.178 0.080 0.106
Resp. full-time, partner part-time 0.621** 0.843** 0.348 0.554*
Resp. part-time, partner full-time 0.266 0.308 0.183 0.135
Hourly pay (ref: about equal)
Resp. hourly pay half that of partner 0.035 0.003 0.057 0.041
Resp. hourly pay double that of partner 0.136 0.089 0.151 0.054
Paid help with housework (ref: none)
Cleaner one morning per week 0.005 0.040 0.005 0.047
Presence of children (ref: none)
6-month-old child 0.024 0.102 0.233 0.325
5-year-old child 0.013 0.247 0.269 0.517*
15-year-old child 0.276* 0.314 0.217 0.117
Interactions: Resp. does <50% housework X
Both part-time 0.262 0.300 0.190 0.131
Resp. full-time, partner part-time 1.021** 1.210** 0.808** 0.520
Resp. part-time, partner full-time 0.456** 0.383 0.507* 0.085
Resp. hourly pay half that of partner 0.019 0.043 0.070 0.110
Resp. hourly pay double that of partner 0.367** 0.366* 0.313 0.070
Cleaner one morning per week 0.068 0.084 0.089 0.004
6-month-old child 0.011 0.015 0.120 0.104
5-year-old child 0.082 0.279 0.184 0.468
15-year-old child 0.478** 0.461* 0.470* 0.021
Interactions: Resp. does >50% housework X
Both part-time 0.094 0.040 0.158 0.112
Resp. full-time, partner part-time 0.457** 0.638** 0.246 0.420
Resp. part-time, partner full-time 0.860** 1.013** 0.658** 0.406
Resp. hourly pay half that of partner 0.135 0.054 0.243 0.166
Resp. hourly pay double that of partner 0.094 0.013 0.166 0.153
Cleaner one morning per week 0.268* 0.363* 0.181 0.216
6-month-old child 0.002 0.116 0.229 0.338
5-year-old child 0.061 0.310 0.263 0.565*
15-year-old child 0.346* 0.382 0.275 0.125
Age 0.037** 0.035** 0.036* 0.002
Age squared 0.0004** 0.0004** 0.0004** 0.00003
Observations 4547 2476 2071 4547
Number of individuals 1541 841 700 1541
Wald test c2
Wald p-value
397.52
0.000
299.79
0.000
158.49
0.000
447.02
0.000
Rho 0.523 0.498 0.553 0.524
Notes: Asterisks denote signiﬁcance levels. **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. Standard errors are robust to correlation between individuals belonging to the same
household.
(1) Model with equal coefﬁcients across gender and using the pooled sample of women and men.
(2) Separate model for women. (3) Separate model for men.
(4) Model with different coefﬁcients across gender and using the pooled sample of women and men.
The Wald test relates to the joint signiﬁcance of all coefﬁcients in the column. It is distributed as c2(31) for Columns 1e3 and c2(63) for Column 4.
Rho is the fraction of the variance of the unobserved component explained by the random effect.
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hypothesis that the coefﬁcients from ﬁxed and random effects models are equal, and we do not reject the hypothesis that the
factors are indeed randomly assigned among respondents. We repeat this test with an extended model, including as addi-
tional explanatory variables individuals’ real-life levels of education, job status, marital status and number of children. The
results are similar, conﬁrming that the vignette factors are indeed uncorrelated with both observable and unobservable
individual characteristics, and that our experiment is a valid random experiment.
5.3.4. Comparability of responses between individuals
A further potential threat to the validity of our experiment is that our estimates may be biased if self-reportedmeasures of
satisfaction are not comparable between individuals (for example, because responses are inﬂuenced by personal perceptionsPlease cite this article in press as: Auspurg, K., et al., Housework share between partners: Experimental evidence on gender-
speciﬁc preferences, Social Science Research (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2017.01.003
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the same comparison of ﬁxed and random effects coefﬁcients that was used above. Fixed effects estimates “net out” any
effects arising from between-individual differences, while random effects models do not; the fact that there are no statis-
tically signiﬁcant differences between our ﬁxed and random effects estimates demonstrates that, to the extent that there exist
unobserved factors which cause individuals to report their levels of satisfaction differently, these cannot bias our results
because they are uncorrelated with our vignette factors.21
5.3.5. Variations between population subgroups
In our experiment we assume that people abstract from their real-life situation when rating hypothetical scenarios. But
this assumption does not automatically hold: factors such as the presence or absence of a partner or children, or real-life
housework arrangements, may inﬂuence the relationship between gender and preferences. Thus, although we observe
few differences between men's and women's preferences across the whole sample, it is possible that gender differences may
exist in certain subgroups of the population. To test this, we repeat our analysis on the subgroups of people who (a) actually
do, or do not, livewith a spouse or partner; (b) actually do, and do not, livewith children; and (c) report actually doing at most
half, or more than half, the housework. For each of these subgroups we re-estimate the linear regression model in Table 3
allowing the coefﬁcients to differ between men and women, and test for the equality of these coefﬁcients across gender
using a Wald test, distributed as chi-squared with 32 degrees of freedom.
We report the results of these tests in Table 5. There appear to be no differences between the sexes by partnership status:
the p-value for the equality of coefﬁcients across genders under the Wald test is 0.181 for people who are married or living
with a partner, and 0.136 for single people.
The analogous test, across people who do and do not have children, yields p-values for the equality of coefﬁcients across
genders of 0.430 for people without children and 0.007 for people with children. This gender difference among people with
children, which is signiﬁcant at the 1% level, arises partly from the fact that in this group, women showmore of an aversion to
unequal housework arrangements (in both directions) than men do; there are also differences between men and women in
the coefﬁcient on doing more paid work than one's partner (with women showing a greater aversion to this arrangement),
although these cancel out when interaction terms are considered.
Differences between the samples of people doing at most half, andmore than half, the housework follow a similar pattern:
among people who do at most half of the housework in real life, there are no signiﬁcant gender differences (p-value 0.395),
whereas among people who actually do more than half the housework, the gender differences are signiﬁcant at the 10% but
not at the 5% level (p-value 0.071). In this case, the differences are driven mainly by differences in the effects of a ﬁve-year-old
child (associated with higher satisfaction of women compared to men), which cancel out when interaction terms are
considered; there do not appear to be systematic differences between men and women over preferences for housework or
paid work.
Thus, at the 5% level of signiﬁcance we do not generally reject the hypothesis that men's and women's preferences for
work arrangements are identical in these subsamples.
5.3.6. Abstraction from own gender
The estimated effects of gender on satisfaction with housework may be inaccurate if people who are asked to report
their level of satisfaction with different hypothetical work arrangements respond as generic individuals rather than as
members of their own gender. We carry out a sensitivity analysis based on a subsample of people for whom gender
identity had been “primed” in the survey via a set of questions administered prior to the vignettes, which asked in-
dividuals to report their satisfaction with a different life domain by comparing themselves with other people of their own
gender (see Burton, 2013 for details). When we re-estimate the model with individual random effects for this subsample,
and test between-gender differences, we do not reject the equality of the coefﬁcients between genders (the test result is
reported in the penultimate row of Table 5). This suggests that the lack of signiﬁcant gender differences in satisfaction
with housework is genuine, rather than being caused by people abstracting from their own gender when answering the
vignette questions.
5.3.7. “Satisﬁcing” by survey respondents
“Satisﬁcing” (Krosnick et al., 1996; Oppenheimer et al., 2009) is a practice whereby, when responding to a survey, some
respondents provide answers to questions, but shortcut their cognitive efforts, so that their responses do not correctly reﬂect
their situation or their opinions. One common strategy of “satisﬁcers” is to give identical answers to all items in a battery of
questions, often at the midpoint of the range. We repeated our analysis excluding respondents who had given the same
response to all three vignettes (note that not all of these will have been “satisﬁcers,” since some people will be genuinely
indifferent between the vignettes). Results are presented in the ﬁnal row of Table 5; our results on gender differences were
not changed.21 Of course, in a survey where people are asked about their satisfaction with their real-life arrangements, factors describing partners' work arrangements,
earning power and so on would not generally be uncorrelated with other individual characteristics, and this could lead to biased estimates.
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Table 5
Testing gender differences in the coefﬁcients of the linear regression model with individual random effects.
Sample Test statistics p-value No. obs.
Full sample 46.77 0.045 4547
Married people 39.11 0.181 2608
Single people 40.86 0.136 1939
People with children 54.78 0.007 1230
People without children 32.74 0.430 3317
Housework share 50% 33.50 0.395 1606
Housework share >50% 44.43 0.071 2941
Gender primed 26.23 0.753 2334
Excluding "Satisﬁcers" 35.08 0.324 3081
Notes: The variables used to deﬁne the different subsample are real-life characteristics. The test is supposed to be distributed as a c2 with 32
degrees of freedom under the assumption of gender equality in the coefﬁcients. Estimations are robust to correlation between individuals
belonging to the same household.
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In this paper, we have discussed competing theories which seek to explain the highly gendered distribution of housework
within couples. We have focused on one group of theories, namely those which propose that gender identity (that is,
internalized gender norms) is responsible for gendered housework shares, via its effect on men's and women's relative
preferences for housework and paid work. We test this theory in an experimental context, by estimating the levels of
satisfaction with different allocations of paid and unpaid work within a partnership, and the differences between men and
women in these levels of satisfaction.
We ask people to visualize themselves in a range of hypothetical scenarios inwhich the share of housework and paid work
done by the respondent and his or her partner is varied, and to report on how satisfactory they ﬁnd each of these scenarios.
Our experimental design circumvents a range of problems which may occur if one attempts to estimate the utility whichmen
and women derive from different work allocations using survey data: post-hoc rationalization, endogeneity, and a paucity of
observations on non-standard work arrangements.
Our main ﬁnding is that both men and women display a marked preference for equity, in terms of both the allocation of
housework and the total allocation of paid and unpaid work; there is little evidence that either men or women are sys-
tematically selﬁsh in their preferences, or that men's preferences differ systematically from those of women, or that either
men or women prefer arrangements under which the woman specializes in home production while the man specializes in
market work. The only exceptions are the following: (1) in situations where there is an unequal sharing of paid work between
partners, women have a slightly stronger preference then men for adjusting their housework share in response to their paid
work share; (2) in scenarios where thewomanworks full-time and themanworks part-time, men's andwomen's preferences
diverge, with women preferring to do less housework than their partner and men preferring to do an equal amount of
housework; (3) in the presence of a young child (6-month- or 5-year-old) women's preference for an equal share of
housework intensiﬁes more than that of men. However, in the few cases where we observe differences, they are small, and
actually go against the gender norm.
In terms of the theoretical frameworks which we discussed earlier, our ﬁndings provide little evidence for the sort of
gendered preferences proposedbyHakim (2000) or byAkerlof andKranton (2000). Ourﬁnding of amarked preference, among
both men and women, for equal and/or equitable arrangements, provides strong support for the applicability of distributive
justice theory to this area (Major,1987; Thompson,1991); the reasons for enduring inequalities in the allocation of housework,
even among a sample of individuals who express a preference for equal arrangements, remains an open question.
Our results are subject to the caveat that they are derived from an experiment conducted in a single country (the United
Kingdom), and cannot necessarily be generalised to other countries. The distribution of housework varies between countries,
as do factors relating to norms, culture and ﬁnancial incentives. In a country such as Germany, where the allocation of
housework and paid work is far more gendered than in the UK, and where this allocation is underpinned by the tax and
beneﬁt system associated with a conservative welfare state, the ﬁndings of a similar study may be very different.
That said, our results are congruent with results from studies based outside the UK which, while they do not directly
measure preferences, suggest an underlying preference for a more equal distribution of housework. Harryson et al. (2012),
using a Swedish sample, suggest that levels of psychological distress are lower, among both men and women, in partnerships
in which housework is shared equally; Lennon and Rosenﬁeld (1994) use a US sample, ﬁnding that depressive symptoms are
more common among womenwho perceive their housework arrangements as unfair; Kalmijn andMonden (2011), also using
a US sample, ﬁnd a lower incidence of depressive symptoms among both husbands and wives in couples where housework is
shared more equally.
Given our empirical results, our main conclusion is that (in the UK at least) women's preferences are not aligned with
gender norms, so that the reasons behind the gendered allocation of housework must lie elsewhere, perhaps in the different
bargaining strategies employed by men and women.Please cite this article in press as: Auspurg, K., et al., Housework share between partners: Experimental evidence on gender-
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housework done by women can only be explained partially by gender differences in observable characteristics. Our ﬁndings
add to this by indicating that it is also unlikely that gender differences in housework shares can be explained by systematic
differences in the utility that men and women derive from doing housework.
So, why do women do such a large share of the housework? It is worth noting that our ﬁnding that there are no
systematic gender differences in preferences over housework allocations does not mean that there are no systematic
gender differences in preferences over other domains, or in personality traits. For example, several psychological studies
(Costa et al., 2001; Schmitt et al., 2008) have reported that women score more highly than men on the personality
dimension of agreeableness. In the presence of a marital hold-up problem, women's tendency to be more agreeable and
less antagonistic (see e.g. Bertrand, 2011) may mean they end up investing more in housework, even if this is not
economically the best choice for them. Put another way, even though women do not derive any more utility from doing
housework than men do, they may derive a greater level of utility than men from avoiding conﬂict in a relationship, with
the net result that they end up doing more housework. Our empirical evidence provides a potential explanation for this
type of behavior in the scenario where women have a full-time work while their partner works part-time. In this scenario
men are happier with an equal share of housework, while women are happier with a lower share of housework. This
situation can create some conﬂict between partners, which might be resolved by women doing actually half of the
housework or by women specializing more in housework and avoiding situations where they do more paid work than
their partner.
In this article we have highlighted the multiple advantages of a vignette-based experimental approach for improving our un-
derstandingof thedeterminantsof thegendereddistributionofhousework; there isnoreasonwhysimilarexperimental techniques
could not be used to examine the possible role of unobservable differences in personality and preferences over other domains.Acknowledgements
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Appendix 1. Tables of main results with standard errorsTable A1
Linear random effects model of satisfaction ratings with standard errors.
Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Women Men Gender difference
Main effects: vignette factors
Share of housework (ref: about the same)
Resp. does <50% of housework 1.106** 1.194** 1.012** 0.190
(0.215) (0.306) (0.277) (0.396)
Resp. does >50% of housework 1.539** 1.699** 1.387** 0.306
(0.207) (0.283) (0.273) (0.372)
Hours of paid work (ref: both full-time)
Both part-time 0.167 0.188 0.094 0.096
(0.174) (0.243) (0.214) (0.299)
Resp. full-time, partner part-time 0.726** 1.030** 0.365 0.671*
(0.164) (0.232) (0.203) (0.299)
Resp. part-time, partner full-time 0.287 0.355 0.179 0.166
(0.171) (0.238) (0.223) (0.311)
Hourly pay (ref: about equal)
Resp. hourly pay half that of partner 0.033 0.015 0.060 0.063
(0.129) (0.186) (0.169) (0.247)
Resp. hourly pay double that of partner 0.148 0.101 0.158 0.059
(0.134) (0.183) (0.182) (0.248)
Paid help with housework (ref: none)
Cleaner one morning per week 0.014 0.015 0.050 0.027
(0.108) (0.156) (0.136) (0.201)
Presence of children (ref: none)
6-month-old child 0.005 0.157 0.238 0.394
(0.152) (0.221) (0.197) (0.293)
5-year-old child 0.034 0.306 0.273 0.585*
(0.156) (0.218) (0.196) (0.279)
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Table A1 (continued )
Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Women Men Gender difference
15-year-old child 0.322* 0.315 0.307 0.001
(0.154) (0.229) (0.200) (0.303)
Interactions: Resp. does <50% housework X
Both part-time 0.313 0.337 0.238 0.106
(0.202) (0.280) (0.263) (0.365)
Resp. full-time, partner part-time 1.249** 1.537** 0.921** 0.633
(0.194) (0.270) (0.262) (0.370)
Resp. part-time, partner full-time 0.533** 0.460 0.571* 0.113
(0.197) (0.273) (0.269) (0.370)
Resp. hourly pay half that of partner 0.009 0.082 0.077 0.154
(0.158) (0.228) (0.201) (0.297)
Resp. hourly pay double that of partner 0.438** 0.458* 0.352 0.091
(0.161) (0.224) (0.222) (0.309)
Cleaner one morning per week 0.105 0.092 0.153 0.062
(0.134) (0.186) (0.175) (0.243)
6-month-old child 0.034 0.057 0.066 0.097
(0.185) (0.261) (0.254) (0.360)
5-year-old child 0.118 0.333 0.157 0.494
(0.185) (0.260) (0.235) (0.334)
15-year-old child 0.578** 0.519* 0.601* 0.100
(0.182) (0.255) (0.244) (0.341)
Interactions: Resp. does >50% housework X
Both part-time 0.088 0.018 0.156 0.131
(0.200) (0.285) (0.255) (0.368)
Resp. full-time, partner part-time 0.531** 0.771** 0.261 0.505
(0.194) (0.278) (0.244) (0.360)
Resp. part-time, partner full-time 1.062** 1.313** 0.760** 0.529
(0.208) (0.290) (0.269) (0.378)
Resp. hourly pay half that of partner 0.167 0.049 0.299 0.244
(0.156) (0.222) (0.214) (0.307)
Resp. hourly pay double that of partner 0.084 0.030 0.180 0.217
(0.162) (0.225) (0.231) (0.322)
Cleaner one morning per week 0.352** 0.453* 0.256 0.198
(0.130) (0.185) (0.165) (0.237)
6-month-old child 0.034 0.178 0.218 0.397
(0.187) (0.265) (0.247) (0.358)
5-year-old child 0.079 0.370 0.282 0.650
(0.183) (0.255) (0.237) (0.335)
15-year-old child 0.391* 0.358 0.381 0.038
(0.187) (0.266) (0.256) (0.365)
Age 0.044** 0.043** 0.040* 0.003
(0.012) (0.016) (0.017) (0.023)
Age squared 0.0004** 0.0004** 0.0004** 0.00003
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Observations 4547 2476 2071 4547
Number of individuals 1541 841 700 1541
Wald test c2 404.02 307.77 167.25 457.38
Wald p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Rho 0.473 0.434 0.518 0.472
Notes: Asterisks denote signiﬁcance levels. **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. Standard errors are robust to correlation between individuals belonging to the same
household.
(3) Model with equal coefﬁcients across gender and using the pooled sample of women and men.
(4) Separate model for women. (3) Separate model for men.
(4) Model with different coefﬁcients across gender and using the pooled sample of women and men.
The Wald test relates to the joint signiﬁcance of all coefﬁcients in the column. It is distributed as c2(31) for Columns 1e3 and c2(63) for Column 4.
Rho is the fraction of the variance of the unobserved component explained by the random effect.
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Ordered probit model for satisfaction with random individual effects and standard errors.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
All Women Men Gender difference
Main effects: vignette factors
Share of housework (ref: about the same)
Resp. does <50% of housework 0.925** 0.973** 0.898** 0.169
(0.184) (0.250) (0.248) (0.335)
Resp. does >50% of housework 1.270** 1.355** 1.217** 0.258
(0.175) (0.232) (0.243) (0.313)
Hours of paid work (ref: both full-time)
Both part-time 0.149 0.178 0.080 0.106
(0.150) (0.204) (0.197) (0.263)
Resp. full-time, partner part-time 0.621** 0.843** 0.348 0.554*
(0.138) (0.188) (0.186) (0.254)
Resp. part-time, partner full-time 0.266 0.308 0.183 0.135
(0.146) (0.199) (0.201) (0.269)
Hourly pay (ref: about equal)
Resp. hourly pay half that of partner 0.035 0.003 0.057 0.041
(0.110) (0.154) (0.150) (0.210)
Resp. hourly pay double that of partner 0.136 0.089 0.151 0.053
(0.112) (0.147) (0.161) (0.207)
Paid help with housework (ref: none)
Cleaner one morning per week 0.005 0.040 0.005 0.047
(0.091) (0.127) (0.123) (0.172)
Presence of children (ref: none)
6-month-old child 0.024 0.102 0.233 0.325
(0.126) (0.174) (0.176) (0.245)
5-year-old child 0.013 0.247 0.269 0.517*
(0.131) (0.178) (0.176) (0.238)
15-year-old child 0.276* 0.314 0.217 0.117
(0.132) (0.191) (0.181) (0.262)
Interactions: Resp. does <50% housework X
Both part-time 0.262 0.300 0.190 0.131
(0.171) (0.231) (0.236) (0.314)
Resp. full-time, partner part-time 1.021** 1.210** 0.808** 0.520
(0.161) (0.215) (0.233) (0.309)
Resp. part-time, partner full-time 0.456** 0.383 0.507* 0.084
(0.166) (0.225) (0.237) (0.314)
Resp. hourly pay half that of partner 0.019 0.043 0.069 0.110
(0.133) (0.185) (0.176) (0.249)
Resp. hourly pay double that of partner 0.367** 0.366* 0.313 0.070
(0.134) (0.179) (0.194) (0.256)
Cleaner one morning per week 0.068 0.084 0.089 0.004
(0.111) (0.149) (0.156) (0.204)
6-month-old child 0.011 0.015 0.120 0.104
(0.152) (0.206) (0.223) (0.298)
5-year-old child 0.082 0.279 0.184 0.468
(0.155) (0.208) (0.212) (0.282)
15-year-old child 0.478** 0.461* 0.470* 0.021
(0.153) (0.208) (0.217) (0.290)
Interactions: Resp. does >50% housework X
Both part-time 0.094 0.040 0.158 0.112
(0.170) (0.234) (0.229) (0.313)
Resp. full-time, partner part-time 0.457** 0.638** 0.246 0.420
(0.162) (0.222) (0.215) (0.298)
Resp. part-time, partner full-time 0.860** 1.013** 0.658** 0.406
(0.172) (0.234) (0.236) (0.317)
Resp. hourly pay half that of partner 0.135 0.054 0.243 0.166
(0.130) (0.179) (0.185) (0.253)
Resp. hourly pay double that of partner 0.094 0.013 0.166 0.153
(0.135) (0.180) (0.202) (0.265)
Cleaner one morning per week 0.268* 0.363* 0.181 0.216
(0.107) (0.148) (0.145) (0.199)
6-month-old child 0.002 0.116 0.229 0.338
(0.153) (0.209) (0.214) (0.295)
5-year-old child 0.061 0.310 0.263 0.565*
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Table A2 (continued )
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
All Women Men Gender difference
(0.153) (0.206) (0.209) (0.280)
15-year-old child 0.346* 0.382 0.275 0.125
(0.158) (0.219) (0.227) (0.311)
Age 0.037** 0.035** 0.036* 0.002
(0.010) (0.013) (0.016) (0.020)
Age squared 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 4547 2476 2071 4547
Number of individuals 1541 841 700 1541
Wald test c2 397.52 299.79 158.49 447.02
Wald p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Rho 0.523 0.498 0.553 0.524
Notes: Asterisks denote signiﬁcance levels. **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. Standard errors are robust to correlation between individuals belonging to the same
household.
(5) Model with equal coefﬁcients across gender and using the pooled sample of women and men.
(6) Separate model for women. (3) Separate model for men.
(4) Model with different coefﬁcients across gender and using the pooled sample of women and men.
The Wald test relates to the joint signiﬁcance of all coefﬁcients in the column. It is distributed as c2(31) for Columns 1e3 and c2(63) for Column 4.
Rho is the fraction of the variance of the unobserved component explained by the random effect.
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